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SMOOTH TRANSITION OR UNFAIR BURDEN?
EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TOBACCO REFORM ACT IN SWISHER
INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. SCHAFER
CARA C. HOULEHAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1938 and 2004, the Agricultural Adjustment Act federally
regulated the U.S. tobacco industry.' In 2004, however, Congress enacted
the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act (hereinafter "FETRA").2 This
tobacco reform act dismantled the Agricultural Adjustment Act's system of
quotas and price supports that significantly affected tobacco growers and
manufacturers.3 In Swisher International, Inc. v. Schafer (hereinafter
"Swisher International")4 , the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the consequences of FETRA on tobacco
manufacturers. In particular, it addressed the magnitude of the burden
imposed on the manufacturers to effectuate a smooth transition into the free
market.'
This Comment will discuss the impact of the Swisher International
decision. Section II provides a background discussion of Swisher
International, including the requirements of FETRA, the history of the
case, and the particular constitutional claims upon which Swisher relies.
Section III describes the court's analysis of each claim, revealing the
process it uses to evaluate the arguments and the authority it relied upon.
Finally, Section IV explains the implications of the Swisher International
decision for aggrieved tobacco manufacturers, for participants in the
Kentucky tobacco market, and for the entire tobacco industry.
Staff Member, Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Law, 2010-
2011. B.A. 2007, Emory University, J.D. expected 2011, University of Kentucky, College of Law.
'Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407 (2010).
2 Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act, 7 U.S.C. § 518-519a (2010).
Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1049 (11 , Cir. 2008).
Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d 1046 (l1 'Cir. 2008).
s See id.
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II. LEGAL CASE AND BACKGROUND
A. Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 instituted a program of
quotas and price supports to federally regulate the tobacco industry. In
2004, however, Congress decided that a conversion to the free market
would best serve the industry.' As a result, it passed FETRA in 2004 to
disassemble the previous system and effectuate a smooth transition to the
new structure.
FETRA requires tobacco manufacturers and importers to fund a
buyout of tobacco farmers over a ten-year period.9 To determine the
amounts owed, the Department of Agriculture employs a two-part
procedure.' 0  In "Step A," the volume of tobacco manufactured is
multiplied by excise tax rates to determine the market share owed by each
class of tobacco manufacturer." In "Step B," the Secretary of Agriculture
considers the number of cigars/cigarettes sold by the individual
manufacturer to decide the percentage of the class assessment for which it
is responsible.12 In Swisher International, manufacturer Swisher objected
to this assessment calculus and the steep financial burden imposed upon it
by FETRA.13
B. History of Swisher International and the Responsibility Imposed on
Swisher
In 2004, the Department of Agriculture ordered Swisher, a cigar
manufacturer, to pay $11 million in buyout payments. 14 With this kind of
yearly assessment, Swisher expected to make payments totaling over $100
million over the course of a ten-year period. 5 In response to this steep
responsibility, Swisher sued the Department of Agriculture in 2005,
disputing the constitutionality of FETRA.16  The district court granted
summary judgment for the Department, stating, "[h]owever unpalatable,
6 Id. at 1049; See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1407.
7 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1049.
9 Id,
1 Id.
" Id. at 1049-50. (Cigars represent one of six classes. The others are cigarettes, snuff, roll-
your-own, chewing tobacco, and pipe tobacco).
'2 Id. at 1050 (the individual assessment rate of cigar and cigarette manufacturers are based
upon the amount of those products sold; however, for the remaining four classes of tobacco products,
the assessment is based upon the number of pounds of tobacco sold).
" See Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1050.14 id
5 Id.
16 Id.
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seemingly unjust and onerous FETRA is to Swisher, and regardless of the
fact that it may have been crafted by lobbyists to relieve cigarette
manufacturers of their financial burdens under the MSA, it is not
unconstitutional."' Swisher appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, leading to the opinion in Swisher International."
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Swisher's arguments and affirmed the
judgment of the lower court in favor of the Department of Agriculture. 9 In
reaching this decision, the court evaluated Swisher's two constitutional
claims: 1) a Fifth Amendment claim 20; and 2) an Equal Protection claim.21
C. Fifth Amendment Claims
First, Swisher contended that FETRA violated the Fifth
Amendment's Takings and Due Process Clauses.22 The Takings Clause
states "private property" shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 23 Relying on this language, Swisher originally asserted to
the district court that FETRA "effects [sic] a direct transfer of money from
manufacturers to private individuals, in this case, producers," while the
Secretary contended that the paments instead constituted a tax, which is
outside the scope of the Clause.2
Additionally, the Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person
shall.. .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without Due Process of
law."25 Swisher claimed to the lower court that the requirements imposed
by FETRA amounted to deprivation of its property without Due Process of
law.26 Essentially, the manufacturer argued that the assessments were
unfair because they were made without regard to actual involvement with
the quota system. 2 7 The Department of Agriculture countered that FETRA
"is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose" and thus cannot violate
the Due Process Clause.
D. Equal Protection Claim
17 Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Johanns, No. 3:05-cv-871-J16-TEM, 2007 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW
4200816, at * 16 (Fla. Dist. Nov. 27, 2007).
" Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1049.
'
9 Id at 1049, 1060.
20 Id at 1049.
21 id
2 Id.23 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24 Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Johanns, No. 3:05-cv-871-Jl6-TEM, 2007 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW
4200816, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Nov. 27, 2007).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26 Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Johanns, No. 3:05-cv-871-Jl6-TEM, 2007 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW
4200816, at *5 (Fla. Dist. Nov. 27, 2007).
27 Id. (further claiming that over the past 10 years, Swisher purchased 99% of its tobacco
from sources outside the U.S.).
28 d
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Swisher based its next challenge to the constitutionality of FETRA
on the Equal Protection Clause.29 Its argument stemmed from its
perception of "adverse and differential treatment based on completely
irrational rules and regulations which in no way are calculated to further the
ends of FETRA."30 Particularly, Swisher claimed that FETRA
discriminated against it because the cigar class is subject to a different
calculation for determining payment amounts than other classes of
manufacturers.3' The Secretary responded, however, that, "to the extent
that [FETRA] treats cigars differently than other forms of tobacco at Steps
A and B, such distinctions are supported by rational bases."32 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court's outcome after the following
analysis.
III. ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURER'S CLAIMS IN SWISHER
INTERNATIONAL
A. Fifth Amendment Claims
Both Swisher and the Secretary relied on the plurality decision of
the Supreme Court in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (hereinafter "Eastern
Enterprises"), which challenged the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit
Act of 1992 under the Takings Clause and Due Process clauses.3 4 The
Swisher International court noted that although Eastern Enterprises
"provide[s] significant guidance for this case," the decision is not binding
authority and analyzed the issues independently.3 ' Analogizing Swisher
International to Eastern Enterprises and citing Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, however, the Eleventh Circuit stated that Congress has
imposed FETRA assessments "as a contribution toward the funding of the
buyout of tobacco growers and the transition to the free market system... a
mere obligation to pay money."36 This obligation does not represent a
property interest, thus taking it outside the scope of the Takings Clause.
In essence, the court finds that there cannot be a taking without an
identifiable property interest being affected.38  In Eastern Enterprises,
Justice Kennedy noted that a property interest might include situations in
29 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1049.
30 Johanns, 2007 U.S.Dist. WESTLAW 4200816, at *6 (quoting Dkt.1.1103).
31 Johanns, 2007 U.S.Dist. WESTLAW 4200816, at *6; Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1050.
2 Johanns, 2007 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW 4200816, at *6.
33 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1049.
3 Id. at 1050 (citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)).
3s Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1050, 1054.
6 Id. at 1054-55.
37 Id. at 1055 (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part)).
38 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1057.
[Vol. 3 No. 1150
2010-2011] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TOBACCO REFORM ACT
which Congress seeks to "appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in
land (e.g., a lien on a particular piece of property), a valuable interest in an
intangible (e.g., intellectual property), or even a bank account or accrued
interest."39 FETRA appears to not fall within any of these listed examples.
Swisher's Takings Clause claim amounted to an assertion that
Congress lacks the power to impose the assessments it demands in
FETRA. 40 However, the Takings Clause "does not operate as a substantive
or absolute limit on the government's power." 41 Instead, it only requires
that if a taking occurs, the government must compensate the owner.42 In the
present case, Swisher challenged the constitutionality of FETRA without
mentioning seeking compensation from the government, suggesting that a
Takings Clause claim was misplaced.43 In addition, five Justices in
Eastern Enterprises suggested that "where the challenge seeks to invalidate
the statute rather than merely seeking compensation for an otherwise proper
taking," the Takings Clause is inapplicable." Therefore, the Swisher
International court concluded that the Takings Clause was not a proper
basis for evaluating Swisher's challenge to FETRA, and, even if it were, the
requirements imposed by FETRA would not amount to a taking.45
Examining Swisher's Fifth Amendment claim, the court found that
FETRA also failed to violate Swisher's Due Process rights.4 6 In making
this determination, the court noted several U.S. Supreme Court cases that
provide the structure for evaluating Due Process claims concerning a
statute. First, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. (hereinafter "Usery")
the Court established a rule that economic legislation is presumed
constitutional.4 ' Therefore, a plaintiff must show that Congress acted
"arbitrarily" and "irrationally" to prove the statute violated Due Process. 48
Second, according to General Motors Corp. v. Romein (hereinafter
"General Motors"), no Due Process violation exists where the government
demonstrates that the statute has a "legitimate legislative purpose furthered
by rational means."49 Finally, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray &
Co. (hereinafter "Pension Benefit") requires a legitimate legislative purpose
" Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (explaining that the Coal Act failed to meet any of these exceptions).
40 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1055.
4 1 d at 1049, 1057.
4 Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d at 1057 (citing Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at
53947) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
41 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1057.
4 Id at 1059.
47 Id at 1057 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
4 Id at 1057.
49 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1057 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191
(1992)).
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for applying a statute retroactively.50 The Swisher International court
assessed each of these considerations individually.
Swisher's Due Process claim relied upon its assertion that FETRA
"imposes retroactive liability that is disproportionate to Swisher's
participation in the price support program."5' In response to Swisher's
contention, the court held that FETRA is not retroactive, and also found a
legitimate legislative purpose based on Pension Benefit.52 In coming to its
retroactivity decision the court relied on the plain language of FETRA,
which stated that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall impose quarterly
assessments during each of fiscal years 2005 through 2014, calculated in
accordance with this section, on each tobacco product manufacturer and
tobacco product importer that sells tobacco products in domestic commerce
in the United States during that fiscal year."5 3 Underlying this section of
FETRA is the clear requirement that a manufacturer new to the tobacco
industry would also be subject to the assessments, which are based on
"current participation in the market...as well as those who participated in
the past."54 FETRA's lack of retroactivity defeated this prong of Swisher's
argument.
However, the court continued to consider Swisher's Due Process
argument in light of other authority. According to the Court in Eastern
Enterprises, "[s]tatutes may be invalidated on Due Process grounds only
under the most egregious of circumstances." 5 Keeping in mind this
requirement and the Usery Court's presumption of constitutionality in
economic legislation, the Swisher International court held that FETRA
withstood Swisher's Due Process claim.56 The court analyzed Congress'
intent and basis for passing FETRA as well as the background of the
tobacco market in order to determine that FETRA served a legitimate
legislative purpose that is neither arbitrary nor irrational.
Due to problems in the industry and the interests of the parties
involved, Congress's plan to deregulate the tobacco industry through
FETRA represented an exercise of power that had a legitimate purpose and
a rational means of achieving that purpose. In explaining this conclusion,
the court notes that the passage of FETRA serves as evidence that Congress
50 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1057 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)).
' Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1057.
52 Id. at 1058.
5 Id. at 1058 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 518d(b)(1) (2010)).
54 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1058.
ss Id. (quoting Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
s6 Swisher Int'l., 550 F.3d at 1059.
sId. at 1059.
"Id. at 1058-59.
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recognized problems in the tobacco industry.59 These problems meant that
the old system of subsidies needed to be altered and the legislature chose to
change it by transitioning to the free market.60 Congress then determined
that "tobacco farmers and quota holders should be provided some cushion
for the transition," and established the system of assessments.' An
obligation was then imposed on tobacco manufacturers and importers to
fund the assessments, "all of whom would benefit from the transition to the
free market system." 6 2  In addition to these benefits, Congress believed
manufacturers and importers were "best suited to pass such increased costs
along to the ultimate consumers."63 Ultimately, Swisher's claims were
"without merit" because it failed to offer evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality of FETRA." In other words, Swisher
could not show any "egregious" circumstances that would permit the court
to invalidate an act that the legislature rationally deemed an appropriate
remedy for the problems in the tobacco industry. While the court would
not speculate on what alternative circumstances might constitute a Due
Process violation, it concluded that if an act is rational, "judgments about
the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the
legislative and executive branches" and courts will be reluctant to disturb
those decisions.
B. Equal Protection Claim
In evaluating Swisher's Equal Protection claim, the court relied on
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (hereinafter "Beach
Communications").6 7 In that case, the Supreme Court utilized the same
rational basis test for analyzing Equal Protection claims, finding that
"[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against Equal Protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification."68 The Beach Communications court
s
9 Id. at 1058.60 id.
61 id
62 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1059.
6 Id.
' Id at 1058.
65 Id. (citing Eastern Enters., 534 U.S. at 550) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
66 Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1058 (citing R.A. Gray, 467 U.S. at 729).
67 Swisher Int'l., Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d at 1059-60.
a Id. at 1060 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc'ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
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also noted that "equal protection is not a license for the courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."69
Considering this framework, the Swisher International court
determined that Swisher's Equal Protection rights were not violated by
FETRA because "there was a rational basis for the Act's methodology."70
In particular, the Step A calculation of cigar manufacturers' market share7 1
was reasonable because cigars are the only type of tobacco with a variable
excise tax rate; therefore, requiring a singular tax rate for the class is
"administratively convenient." 7 2  Again relying on administrative
convenience, the court concluded that Step B also contained a rational
basis, even though the calculus considered the number of cigars sold rather
than size, and Swisher mostly produced small cigars.7 3 While the court's
analysis failed to elaborate on the rationality of the assessment calculus, it
also noted that "'the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task and an unavoidable one,' and perfection is not required in
making the necessary classifications."74 Consistent with its analysis of
Swisher's due process claims, the court seemed to recognize that it is ill-
suited to disparage a complex legislative duty.75
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Swisher International illustrates that courts show a
substantial amount of deference to the legislature when evaluating claims of
unconstitutionality concerning economic legislation. Indeed, the
requirement that a statute must be egregious in nature in order to be struck
down is a difficult standard to meet. Further, the test employed by the
Swisher International court in evaluating Due Process arguments requires
only a cursory evaluation of Congressional intent and the factual basis of
the claim to find a legitimate purpose with a rational basis. As a result, any
party seeking to demonstrate a Fifth Amendment violation has an almost
insurmountable burden of showing that an act has no reasonable
foundation. Additionally, the Swisher International court's analysis
persuasively evaluated the Takings Clause, relying upon the Supreme Court
for guidance, and suggested that FETRA assessments will rarely be
invalidated under a Takings Clause framework as they are mere obligations
to pay money. Finally, the rational basis test utilized in considering Equal
69 Id. at 1060 (FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313).
'o Swisher Int'l, 550 F.3d at 1060.
71 See generally Id. at 1050. (Cigar manufacturers assessment based on maximum excise tax
rate, not actual excise rate that applies to other types of tobacco).
72 Idat 1060.
n Id.
7 Id. (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)).
7 Swisher InT 'l., 550 F.3d at 1060.
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Protection claims also affords significant deference to the legislature.
Swisher's claim was struck down on the simple finding that FETRA's
assessment calculus was administratively convenient, despite the fact that
Swisher's position as a small cigar manufacturer was somewhat different
from others affected by the assessments.
This decision indicates that potential future challenges to FETRA
will also likely fail. As FETRA is in place until 2014, even those tobacco
manufacturers, like Swisher, with seemingly disproportionate
responsibilities will continue to shoulder the high financial burden of
funding the transition to the free market economy. While the court in
Swisher International found that FETRA represented only a taxing burden
to manufacturers, the act itself represents the evolving future of the
industry. Because Swisher International suggests that FETRA will remain
intact and survive constitutional challenges, the repercussions of the
holding speak to not only the legal questions presented by FETRA, but to
its consequences on the tobacco industry.
In Kentucky, FETRA carries particularly far-reaching implications.
Before the implementation of FETRA, more than half of the tobacco farms
in the U.S. made their home in Kentucky and the state ranked second in the
nation in tobacco production.76 Following FETRA, about 72% of tobacco
farmers in Kentucky left the industry, while the businesses of those
currently active in the market have grown.n Chief among concerns with
FETRA is that "in 2009, the accelerated decline in domestic consumption,
the high value of the U.S. dollar compared to other currencies, and an
increase in foreign tobacco production have caused concern about how
growers will fare without the safety net of a price support program and a
guaranteed buyer.",7  Since it necessarily follows that manufacturers who
rely upon those farmers will be impacted by changes in the system as well,
a high level of uncertainty exists about the future of the U.S. tobacco
market. Regardless of those concerns, FETRA is not only currently at work
in the tobacco industry, but Swisher International suggests that FETRA is
here to stay for its ten-year duration.
According to Swisher International, FETRA stemmed from
Congress' rational decision to achieve the legitimate purpose of
restructuring the tobacco market in response to the perceived needs of the
industry. As such, challenges to the Act's validity seem to be fruitless
efforts. Consequently, tobacco manufacturers faced with the liability of
paying assessments to growers would be best served by accepting their
7 Will Snell, The Buyout: Short-Run Observations and Implications for Kentucky's Tobacco
Industry (2005) http://www.ca.uky.edulcmspubsclass/files/lpowers/buyout/buyout shortrun.pdf.
n Katie Pratt, 5 Years After the Tobacco Buyout, THE MAGAZINE, 2009,
httpJ/www.ca.uky.edu/agcomm/magazine2009/FALL-2009/Articles/FiveYearsAftertheTobaccoBuyoutitml.
78 id
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plight and focusing on the long-term results of the free market system.
After all, Congress considered the perspectives of both growers and
manufacturers in enacting FETRA. Perhaps patient compliance with
assessments for the remainder of the ten-year period will result in a
radically divergent outlook on FETRA should the anticipated results of the
free market system come to fruition.
V. CONCLUSION
While FETRA represents a major transition in the tobacco industry,
Swisher International demonstrates a fixed reluctance by courts to disturb
congressional acts. Deciding in favor of the Secretary of Agriculture, the
court imposes a steep burden on manufacturers like Swisher to demonstrate
violations of its constitutional rights that it is unlikely to be able to meet. In
evaluating Swisher's claims, the court found the Takings Clause
inapplicable, an absence of egregious circumstances that would violate Due
Process, and a rational basis for FETRA that dismisses Equal Protection
violations. As a result of this decision, FETRA will likely remain intact
through 2014 and despite the steep economic responsibility imposed on
tobacco manufacturers, the industry will complete its transition to the free
market.
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ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS CHALLENGING OFFSHORE
DRILLING AS EXPLAINED IN CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY V. UNITED STA TES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
KATHERINE L. HUDDLESTON
I. INTRODUCTION
The now infamous chant "Drill, baby, drill" that filled town halls
and auditoriums across the country during the 2008 United States
presidential election has come to represent the deep political divide in the
United States over the prospect of drilling for oil. After the BP oil spill in
the summer of 2010, this divide has grown even larger, particularly
concerning offshore drilling. However, offshore drilling is hardly a new
phenomenon.
The United States Congress originally passed the Outer Continental
Shelf Leasing Act (hereinafter "OCSLA") in 1953.' This legislation
provided a framework for leasing outer continental shelf areas to private
organizations for the purpose of searching for oil.2 However, two major
developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to large overhauls of the
'53 Act and the OCSLA guidelines.3 These two events were: 1) the
massive oil spill caused by an outer continental shelf "drilling project in the
Santa Barbara Channel on January 28, 1969;"4 and 2) the 1973 Arab oil
embargo, which clearly demonstrated the U.S.'s dependence on foreign
oil.5 The combination of these two incidents highlighted both the serious
environmental dangers of offshore drilling and the pressing need for U.S.
energy independence. Consequentially, Congress passed the 1978
Amendments to OCSLA, which are still in effect today.
Balancing this delicate dichotomy has been both a goal and a
challenge for the Department of the Interior (hereinafter "Interior"),
environmental protection groups and U.S. courts over the past 35 years.
Traditionally, this balance tilted towards energy independence and away
from environmental protection. However, the April 17, 2009 decision of
' Staff member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011. B.A., cum laude, 2008 Georgetown University. J.D. expected 2011,
University of Kentucky, College of Law.
' State of Cal. v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Outer Content
Self Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2010)).2
1Id
3Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1295.
Id.
6 Id at 1296.
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the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for Biological
Diversity v. United States Department of the Interior (hereinafter "Center
for Biological Diversity")7 gives renewed hope to environmental groups
seeking to challenge offshore drilling programs.
This Comment will discuss the Center for Biological Diversity
opinion, its analysis and holding. Section II specifically relates to the legal
and factual background surrounding the case. Section III provides an
overview of the analysis of the D.C. Circuit Court while Section IV
identifies certain implications that are likely to result from this important
decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
The plaintiffs in Center for Biological Diversity brought several
claims under OCSLA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1973
(hereinafter "NEPA") and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (hereinafter
"ESA"). 8 Of these, the court only reached the merits of the claims under
OCSLA.9
OCSLA sets up a four-tiered system by which the Secretary of the
Interior is required to evaluate and process outer continental shelf leasing
agreements.' 0 The tiers are as follows: 1) the "preparation stage;" 2) the
"lease-sale stage;" 3) the "exploration stage;" and 4) the "development and
production stage."" Each tier is subject to a different level of review. 12
The requirements under OCSLA are binding on leasing
agreements evaluated by the Department of the Interior. However, even if
the Interior satisfies the above-mentioned requirements of OSCLA, other
federal statutes may bear on the agency's action. For example, NEPA
requires that any governmental agency "assess the environmental
consequences of 'major [flederal actions' by following certain procedures
during the decision-making process."' To demonstrate compliance with
this NEPA requirement, an agency must prepare and submit an
Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS"), detailing "the
environmental impact of the proposed [agency] action."' 4
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
8 Id at 471-72.
9 Id at 472.
sId at 473.
"Id
12 Sec'y of the Interior v. Cal., 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
' Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C.Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (2010)).
" Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 565 F.3d at 474 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii)
(2010)).
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Additionally, the ESA requires an agency to consider any threat
that a proposed action may pose to an endangered species before
proceeding with that action." If the agency determines that an endangered
species may be affected, the agency must then "pursue either formal or
informal consultation with the [National Marine Fisheries Service] or Fish
and Wildlife" before proceeding.' 6
As Center for Biological Diversity and other relevant cases
demonstrate, these environmental acts may work separately or in tandem to
affect a proposal for outer continental shelf leasing.
A. Case Background
Center for Biological Diversity arose as a result of an order by the
Interior approving an expansion of leasing areas under OCSLA off the
coast of Alaska. 17 Three environmental groups, the Center for Biological
Diversity, the Pacific Environment, and the Alaska Wilderness League,
filed separate petitions opposing this action.' 8  The cases of those
Petitioners were combined and joined by the Native Village of Point Hope,
Alaska, a tribal government.19
The groups filed four claims against the Interior.2 0  First, the
petitioners claimed that the Interior's actions violated OCSLA and NEPA
because the "Interior failed to take into consideration both the effects of
climate change on OCS [outer continental shelf] areas and the Leasing
Program's effects on climate change." 21 Second, the Petitioners argued that
the Interior violated OCSLA and NEPA by failing to conduct "sufficient
biological baseline research" for the affected areas.22 Third, Petitioners
alleged the Interior violated ESA because the Interior failed to consult with
either the National Marine Fisheries Service or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service regarding the possible effect of the program on endangered
species.2 3 Finally, Petitioners asserted the Interior violated OCSLA because
it "irrationally relied on an insufficient study" conducted by the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (hereinafter "NOAA") as
its sole authority in evaluating the "environmental sensitivity" of the OCS
areas included in the program.24
1s Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2)).
16 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474-75; (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.13, 402.14
(2009)).
" Center for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 471-72.
" Id. at 472.
1 Id.
20 Id at 471.
21 Id. at 471.
22 Id. at 471-72.
23 Centerfor Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 472.
24 id
KY J. EQUINE, AGRi., & NAT. RESOURCE L.
As previously discussed, approval of OCS leasing occurs in four
stages. At which stage the action is brought will determine the level of
review given by the courts. In this case, the Interior had only completed
stage one, the preparation stage, when this action commenced. 25  The
preparation stage is governed by Section 18 of OSCLA and requires the
Secretary of the Interior to "prepare, periodically revise, and maintain" a
program that is "conducted in a manner which considers economic, social,
and environmental values" of the OCS resources and "the potential impact
,,26
of ... exploration on ... the marine, coastal, and human environments.
During this stage, the Secretary is also required to "consider additional
factors with respect to the timing and location of exploration, development,
and production of oil and gas in particular OCS areas."27 These additional
factors include:
a region's "existing information concerning the
geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics; an
equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
environmental risks among the various regions"; [sic] "the
interest of potential oil and gas producers in the
development of oil and gas resources"; [sic] "the relative
environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of
different areas of the [OCS]"; [sic] and "relevant
environmental and predictive information for different
areas of the OCS."2 8
The final requirement during the preparation stage holds the
Interior responsible for striking a delicate balance between the benefits of
searching for oil and gas and the negative effects the search may have on
29the surrounding environment.
Therefore, the court examined the Petitioners' claims in relation to
these first tier requirements.
25 Id. at 473.
26 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 473 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX1)).27 Id at 473.
28 Id (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(A), (B), (E), (G), (H) (1978)).
29 Id at 474 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (a)(3)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Standing
The first major hurdle for the Petitioners in Center for Biological
Diversity was to establish standing for their claims against the Interior.
What may seem like a small obstacle can actually be extremely difficult for
plaintiffs alleging an ideological opposition to governmental action. This
difficulty results from Article III, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, which mandates that the role of the federal judiciary must be
limited to handling actual "cases" and "controversies."30 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this limitation to mean that courts must "protect
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties."3  The second part of this interpretation, requiring that plaintiffs
feel the effects of an administrative decision "in a concrete way" before
bringing an action, is the basis for the standing doctrine.32
The court then discussed two types of standing, substantive and
procedural, in its analysis of this case. For substantive standing, the court
used the standard and analysis set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
"a petitioner must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury that is caused by, or fairly traceable to, the act
challenged in the litigation and redressable by the court." Applying this
standard to the facts of this case, the court found that the Petitioners lacked
substantive standing because they had yet to suffer "an injury that affects
[them] in a 'personal and individual' way." 34 Furthermore, the Petitioners
could not establish a causal link between such an injury and the actions of
the Interior.35
Under the injury requirement of the substantive theory of standing,
the court declared that "standing analysis does not examine whether the
environment in general has suffered an injury." 36 Therefore, Petitioners'
standing claim of "climate change ... shared by humanity at large," failed to
establish substantive standing because the alleged injury was too
"conjectural or hypothetical."3 7  However, the court went on to say that
even if the injury were sufficient to establish substantive standing, the
Petitioners could not demonstrate a causal link between such injury and the
3o U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 1.
31 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
32 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 477.
3 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 477. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
' Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1).
3 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d it 478.
36 Id. (citing Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 at 665).
3 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 478; See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
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actions of the Interior, especially this early in the leasing process when no
actual exploration had yet taken place."
Under this analysis, it seems that an environmental protection
group might never be able to establish standing to make a claim against the
Interior regarding an outer continental shelf leasing program. However, the
court continued to evaluate Petitioners' claims under a theory of procedural
standing.
Procedural standing was defined by an earlier decision of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Florida Audubon Society v.
Bentsen." That case declared that, "a plaintiff must show not only that the
defendant's acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that there is
a substantial probability that the procedural breach will cause the essential
injury to the plaintiff's own interestAO In Center for Biological Diversity,
the "threatened concrete interest" asserted by the Petitioners is the desire to
"observe an animal species."4A This interest has been recognized by the
Supreme Court as a valid basis for standing if plaintiffs show proof of
"concrete plansA 2 to visit and observe the species in the near future,
providing "definitive dates" not just hopes or desires.43 The Petitioners
provided this information, and, therefore, the court found that they
established grounds for standing under the procedural theory.
B. Ripeness for Review
After establishing standing for their claims, Petitioners had to prove
that the issues they raised were ripe for review." Ripeness of an issue for
review is also mandated by the "case or controversy" requirement of the
Constitution for federal court jurisdiction to exist.4 5  Ripeness
considerations go to the first half of the Supreme Court standard for "case
or controversy" cited earlier, stating that agencies could not be subject to
"judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized."46  This requirement presented serious problems for the
Petitioners' ESA and NEPA-based claims.
The ESA requires that an agency examine any impact a proposed
action may have on an endangered species.47 If the agency determines that
" Id. at 479.
9 Fla. Audubon Soc 'y, 94 F.3d 658.
o Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc 'y, 94 F.3d at
664).
41 Id.
42 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564).
" Center for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479.
4 Id. at 480-84.
" Id at 475.
4 Id. (quoting Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 148-49).
4 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 474.
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a species may be at risk, the agency is then required to consult with either
the National Marine Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS") or Fish and
Wildlife. Based on this requirement, Petitioners brought their third claim
alleging that the lease approval was invalid because of Interior's failure to
consult with these agencies. 49 However, the court found that this claim
ignored the negative implication of the ESA, namely that consultation with
the NMFS or Fish and Wildlife was not required if an agency determined
that no endangered species would be impacted by the proposed action.50
Although Petitioners claimed that the Interior's determination was
incorrect, the court held that the tiered structure of the leasing system must
be taken into consideration. Upholding and citing a previous ruling, North
Slope Borough v. Andrus,5' the court stated "we must consider any
environmental effects of a leasing program on a stage-by-stage basis, and
correspondingly evaluate ESA's obligations with respect to each particular
stage of the program."5 2 Therefore, as the program under review had only
completed the first tier of the leasing process and "by design"... "the
welfare of animals" had yet to be implicated, the court found the claim
made by Petitioners based on an alleged violation of ESA requirements to
be premature.53
The NEPA claim faced similar challenges. The court cited its
previous decision in Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest
Service for the proposition that the obligations placed on an agency by
NEPA only mature when the agency reaches a "critical stage of decision
which will result in 'irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources' to an action that will affect the environment."5 4 Therefore, in the
NEPA analysis, the tiered system of OSCLA was, once again, a
determinative factor. The court concluded that under that tiered system,
the "critical stage of decision" was not reached until the leases were
actually issued. 5 Thus, any claim before that time would be considered
premature and not ripe for review.
Despite petitioners' success in establishing procedural standing,
their claims under NEPA and ESA ultimately failed because the issues
presented were not ripe for review. Therefore, the only claims left for the
court to address were the OCSLA-based claims.
4 Id. at 474-75.
49 Id. at 472.
5o Id. at 475 (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443,
1447 (9th Cir. 1996)).
s' North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
52 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 483.
53id.
54 Id. at 480 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
" Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 480.
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C. Justiciable OCSLA Claims
When reviewing the approval of a leasing program under OCSLA,
courts use a two-tier system of review. 56 The first tier involves "findings of
ascertainable fact," which courts evaluate based on a "substantial evidence
test" where the basis for such findings must be "more than a scintilla," but
"may be less than a preponderance of the evidence."57  The second tier
looks at the policy judgments of an agency, which are reviewed to
determine if the decision was "based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there [was] a clear error of judgment."5 8 Petitioners'
first claim under OCSLA alleged the failure of the Secretary of the Interior
to properly take into account the environmental costs associated with
consumption of oil and gas derived from the lease and the climate change
that would be caused by the consumption of these fuels. 9 While OCSLA
requires the Interior to evaluate any adverse environmental effect that could
be caused by the lease, the court found Petitioners' extension of this duty to
include a duty to examine any potential adverse effects of the consumption
of the oil and gas, rather than just the recovery of such oil and gas, as much
too tenuous, stating that "the Secretary ... need only consider the 'potential
for environmental damage' on a localized basis."60 Therefore, the court
found that the Interior has no duty to consider potential future effects of
consumption when evaluating leasing programs.6 '
Instead, the court held that the Interior's decision to focus its
environmental effect analysis on the effects of the actual production
activities that would occur under the lease was proper.6 2 In making this
analysis, the Interior evaluated the potential "greenhouse gas emissions that
would result from leasing, exploration, and development in the OCS, and
examined the cumulative impact of these emissions on the global
environment."'63 The court found that these efforts satisfied the
requirements of OCSLA.64
The court then turned to Petitioners' final claim that the Interior's
sole reliance on a study conducted by the NOAA for its compliance with
OCSLA's requirement to consider "the relative environmental sensitivity of
16 Id. at 484.
s7 Id. at 484 (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC. V. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
8 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 484 (quoting Watt I, 668 F.2d at 1302).
s9 Ctr. for Biological Diversity at 485.
60 id.
6" See Id. (the "Interior simply lacks the discretion to consider any global effects that oil and
gas consumption may bring about").
6'2 Id. at 485.
63 Id. at 486.
6 Id. at 485.
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... different areas of the outer Continental Shelf's6 was insufficient. 6
Previous cases had held that "all that is required for compliance with
Section 18(a)(2)(G) is 'that the Secretary make a good faith determination
of the relative environmental sensitivity"' and that the Secretary was "free
to use any methodology 'so long as it is not irrational."' 6 7 While the court
upheld this loose standard, it also went on to declare that Interior's actions
in this case violated it.
The NOAA study relied on by the Interior examined environmental
sensitivity of the Alaskan coastline but did not evaluate any offshore
areas.68 Therefore, by relying on this study, the Interior failed the OCSLA
requirement that it consider the sensitivity of "different areas of the outer
Continental Shelf."6 9 The court went on to explain that Interior's duties
under OCSLA for the first stage of the leasing process require a balancing
of the "potential for environmental damage, potential for the discovery of
oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone." 70
Such a balance is impossible when the Interior fails to properly consider
one of these factors, as it did in this case.
Based on this analysis, the court in Center for Biological Diversity
found in the Petitioners' favor and vacated the Interior's approval or the
leasing program, remanding it to the Interior for further consideration
consistent with the court's opinion.7 1 According to the court, such further
consideration must begin with a "more complete comparative analysis" of
the outer continental shelf areas potentially affected by the program.72
IV. IMPLICATIONS
With constant worries looming over the ever increasing prices of
oil worldwide and the amount of greenhouse gases trapped in the
atmosphere, future battles between environmental groups and the
government over OCSLA will likely be more common and more
contentious than ever before. Courts will be asked to decide what should
come first, garnering the fossil fuels our country needs or guarding an
already fragile environment that protects life on this planet? There is no
perfect answer, and as this debate continues the delicate balance mandated
by OCSLA and upheld by the court in this case will be challenged from
both sides.
6' 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (a)(2)(G) (1978).
6 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 487.
67 Id. at 488 (quoting California v. Watt (Watt I), 712 F.2d 584, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(affirming the holding in Watt1, 668 F.2d at 1313)).
68 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 488.
69 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(G) (1978).
70 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 488 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX3)).
1 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d. at 489.
7 2Id. at 488.
KY J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCE L.
The ruling in Center for Biological Diversity has important
implications for both sides of this debate. For environmental groups, the
court clearly states the standards for establishing standing for these claims.
Establishing standing can be a serious challenge for groups opposing
government action on ideological grounds, as the Supreme Court has
consistently held that injuries must be particularized.7 ' Therefore, claims of
injury to the global environment affecting all residents are generally
insufficient.74 Establishing standing requires not only a showing of a
particularized injury, but also the establishment of a causal link between the
governmental action and the injury. Proving this element becomes even
more difficult when dealing with the kind of tiered system present under
OCSLA wherein actual damage to the environment does not occur until
leases have been obtained and drilling begins. Therefore, preemptive
environmental protective action appears almost impossible under the
standing rules.
However, the court in this case outlined very specific parameters by
which environmental groups can establish standing for these challenges.
Plaintiffs may establish a particularized injury in these cases by showing
that, by omitting some procedural requirements under OCSLA, the
76
governmental agency has threatened some concrete interest. Since an
actual injury need not have occurred to permit a claim, preemptive action
may be taken. However, groups must demonstrate a "concrete interest,"
and, in these cases, the simplest way to establish such an interest is to
provide affidavits from members of the plaintiff groups confirming both an
interest in and desire to "observe an animal species," for any purpose, and
"concrete plans" for making such observations including "definitive" travel
dates. While these are highly specific requirements and might be
difficultly to meet, because of this opinion and Lujan before it, groups have
the court's explicit approval of such a course of action to satisfy the
standing requirements.
However, once groups establish standing, they must still defend
their claims on the merits. These groups typically assert claims that the
governmental action fails on review because the agency did not "abide by a
procedural requirement" that was designed to protect an established interest
of a plaintiff.79  However, the Center for Biological Diversity court
7 Id. at 477-89 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 and Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 665 to
generally discuss the law of standing).
4 Id. at 478.
" Id. at 477-78 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 and holding that Petitioners' could not
establish either element of standing for their substantive climate change claims).
76 Cr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8).
7 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479.
7 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
9 Ctr for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 479 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).
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provided some encouragement for groups making these claims through its
evaluation of the Interior's duties under OCSLA. When evaluating the
Petitioners' OCSLA environmental sensitivity claim, the court upheld the
previously stated standard requiring that the Interior act in "good faith" and
refrain from "irrational" methodology in making sensitivity
determinations,80 but seemed to move away from that extreme deference
stating that previous precedent "did not give Interior carte blanche to
wholly disregard a statutory requirement out of convenience." 1 Instead,
the court implied that Interior's discretion in making the necessary
environmental determinations under OCSLA is not absolute and its actions
must accord with the strict requirements of the text.
Therefore, the court's opinion in this case should give a great deal
of hope to environmental groups seeking to oppose programs authorized
under OCSLA and provides an excellent guide for how they can effectively
do so. However, the court also provides protection for the Interior in
exercising its rights and duties under OCSLA. Despite the court's order to
vacate the Interior's approval of the leasing program in this case, the court
made it clear that outer continental shelf leasing programs will be upheld as
long as the Interior takes care to strictly comply with the requirements of
OCSLA.
V. CONCLUSION
While this case provides a useful guide to environmental groups
seeking to challenge leasing programs under OCSLA, it also dictates how
the Interior can successfully stave off such challenges. When the Interior
fails to meet the requirements of OCSLA, environmental groups can
establish standing and oppose the program at issue. However, by strict
compliance with the requirements of OCSLA, the Interior can protect itself
from such challenges and go forward with approvals of leasing programs.
Thus, "to drill or not to drill" has a definitive answer, at least for
the time being. When done in strict compliance with the law, off-shore
drilling is permissible under existing statutes and any prohibition of such
drilling would require further legislative action. However, while outer
continental shelf drilling is a part of American life, this case demonstrates
that the courts can be a useful tool in ensuring that such programs only
occur with proper consideration and protection of the surrounding
environment.
oId. at 487-88. See Watt I, 668 F.2d 1290; Watt II, 712 F.2d 584.
SId. at 488.

DEPAUL v COMMONWEALTH: A LOOK AT POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HORSE-RACING
INDUSTRY
STEPHANIE M. WURDOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 2004, Pennsylvania enacted the Pennsylvania Race Horse
Development and Gaming Act ("Gaming Act" or "Act").' The Act
functioned as a vessel through which the state legislature could introduce
legalized slot machine gaming in Pennsylvania and brought with it hopes of
increased state revenue and additional forms of tax relief.2 The Act was
designed to maintain the integrity of the gaming industry and Vrotect the
public through strict regulation and policing of gaming activities. Included
within the Gaming Act are various tools for accomplishing the legislature's
goals, one of which is Section 1513, entitled "Political Influence."" Section
1513 identifies a class of individuals within the gaming industry and
prohibits its members from making certain political contributions.s
Specifically, this section bans certain individuals from contributing
financially to local political party committees, groups organized in support
of local candidates, or the campaigns of candidates running for local public
office.
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed and decided
DePaul v. Commonwealth, in which the Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of this political ban as being an "overly broad and
unlawfully discriminatory infringement of the rights to free expression and
association." 7 These rights are guaranteed by Article I, Sections 7, 20, and
26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.'
* Articles Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURAL, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2010-2011; B.A. in Marketing 2008, summa cum laude, University of Kentucky; J.D.
expected May 2011, University of Kentucky College of Law.
' Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-1904
(2006) (amended 2010).
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Gaming"
hyperlink; then follow "Benefits for Pennsylvanians" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2004).
4 Id. at § 1513, declared unconstitutional by DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (Pa.
2009).
Id. at § 1513(a).
6 Id.
DePaul, 969 A.2d at 538.
'Id.
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The Petitioner in DePaul was a local businessman who held a
9.54% controlling interest in Philadelphia Entertainment and Development
Partners ("PEDP"), a company which owned a local casino.9 According to
definitions provided in the Gaming Act, that ownership interest qualified
Petitioner as a "principal" and subjected him to the political ban.'o Wholly
unaware of Section 1513's prohibitions, he made twenty-one political
contributions in 2006, a number of which fell within the Section 1513
restrictions." Upon realizing his error, Petitioner requested a total refund
of his contributions and entered into a consent decree with the Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board ("Control Board"). 12
The resulting court opinion in DePaul addressed the conflict
between the Gaming Act's primary objective, the protection of public
confidence, and that of the judiciary, the protection of constitutional rights.
By examining the decision in DePaul, this Comment analyzes how courts
might strike a balance between the competing interests of the public at-
large and those of individuals affiliated with racing and gaming facilities.
In Section II, this Comment discusses the legal background of
DePaul. Next, Section III presents Petitioner's constitutional claims.
Section IV examines the court's survey of similar judicial decisions, while
Section V discusses and interprets the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
holding. Finally, Section VI considers the implications of that decision for
the gaming industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
DePaul evaluated the constitutionality of the Gaming Act's Section
1513 political ban on two grounds. First, the court assessed the ban's
restriction of the right of free speech and association which are guaranteed
by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3  Second, it
considered whether the ban violated Article I, Section 26 of the state
constitution which restricts unlawful or baseless discrimination against any
person's civil rights.' 4
9 Id.
1o See 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2006) (amended 2010).
"DePaul, 969 A.2d at 539.
12 Id. at 539-40.
nId. at 540.
4 Id. at 541.
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1. Gaming Act Provisions
The Gaming Act had a number of goals which included furthering
the tourism market, promoting and assisting the horse racing industry, and
generating new revenue for the state of Pennsylvania."s One additional,
relevant purpose was to maintain and enhance public trust in local elected
officials in the advent of slot machine gambling.' 6  Section 1102
specifically articulated the Pennsylvania legislature's desire to maintain the
integrity of gaming regulations in order to prevent actual corruption or the
appearance of corruption that may result from campaign contributions, as
well as "ensure bipartisan administration of [the Act]; and avoid actions
that may erode public confidence in the system of representative
government."' 7
The state legislature set out to achieve this goal by writing a
number of regulatory provisions into the Act. Section 1103 sets the
groundwork by defining pertinent terminology, including the term
"principal." 18 The Act defines a "principal" as a person having an
ownership interest in restricted gaming activity.' 9 This definition includes
officers, directors, and any other person who owns a beneficial interest or
has a controlling interest in a gaming applicant or licensee.2 0 For the
purposes of the Act, an "applicant" is defined as a person who requests
permission to engage in a gaming activity that is restricted therein, for
example, installing slot machines.21
Section 1513 then imposed upon those individuals a restriction on
political contributions. Specifically, the Act prohibited principals of slot
machine licensees, licensed manufacturers, licensed suppliers, and licensed
racing entities from making political contributions to local candidates for
public office or to local political parties.2 2 Section 1513 also went so far as
to ban attendance at political functions such as dinners, meetings, and
fundraising events that required the purchase of a ticket.23
To enforce the political ban and other regulations, the Gaming Act
required that a Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board ("Control Board") be
established and, within that board, a Bureau of Investigations and
Enforcement ("Bureau") be created.2 4 The Control Board's website, which
" 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (3), (4), (6) (2004) (amended 2010).
'
6 Id. at § 1102 (11).
7 Id. at § 1102 (11).
8 Id. at § 1103.
19 Id.
20 id
21 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103 (2006) (amended 2010).
2 Id at § 1513(a).
23 Id. at § 1513(d).
1 Id. at §§ 1201(a), 1517(a).
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it is required to create and maintain by statute,25 states that its mission is to
"protect the interest of the public by ensuring the integrity of legalized
gaming through the strict enforcement of the law and regulations....26 The
Bureau, although existing entirely within the Control Board, acts
independently in matters relating to the political ban.2 As the independent
body for enforcing those ban provisions, it is empowered investigate and
review all permit or license applicants and generally monitor all gaming
28
operations.
2. Pennsylvania Constitutional Provisions
The constitutional challenge in DePaul derived from freedoms
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, Section 7 of the
state constitution provides that "the free communication of thoughts and
opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write and print out on the subject...." 29 This, in conjunction with the
right of petition granted by Article I, Section 20, provides generous
protection for freedom of speech and association.30 Additionally, Article I,
Section 26 establishes that neither the state nor its agencies may
discriminate against an individual's exercise of his civil rights in an
unlawful or baseless manner.31  These constitutional guarantees, although
slightly broader in reality, are considered equal to the U.S. Constitution's
First Amendment Right of Free Speech for the purposes of this Comment.
B. Political Corruption
Many of the Gaming Act provisions, Section 1513 in particular, are
premised upon the belief that racing and gaming industry leaders use wealth
and influence to sway local politicians to act in the industry's best interests.
Society fears that this enables casinos and other gaming facilities to unfairly
influence the entire political process. 32  This is evidenced by a "long-
standing and strong sensitivity to the evils traditionally associated with ...
gambling when it is unregulated" in America.33 Gambling regulations do
little to quiet these fears; for even when regulatory processes are put into
2
s I. at §1513 (a.2) (1).
26 Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, Mission Statement, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us
(follow "About PCGB" hyperlink; then follow "Vision Statement / Mission Statement" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010).
27 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1517 (a) (2006) (amended 2010).
28 Id. at § 1517 (a)-(a.1).29 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
'o See PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 20.
' DePaul, 969 A.2d at 541; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
3 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545 (citing Petition of Soto, 565 A.2d 1088, 1093-1094 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989)).
" DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545.
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place, their integrity is often called into question.34 Arguably, a regulation
process that is laxly monitored and enforced, while created with noble
intentions, leads to erosion of confidence in the integrity of a state's
representative government.
Furthermore, a significant percentage of Americans consider
gambling to be an activity that is "rife with evil" and mischievous in terms
of the public welfare and morality.35 These some people do not even
believe that gambling should be legal, much less loosely regulated.
Therefore, it would be irresponsible to ignore the possibility that popular
public disapproval of gambling may in fact outweigh the activity's
economic benefits for the state, whatever its regulations or restrictions.
III. DEPAULS'S CLAIMS
Petitioner's main claim in DePaul was that the Gaming Act's
political ban was "overly broad and unlawfully discriminatory" so as to
violate Petitioner's constitutional rights of political expression and
association. Petitioner asserted that the Act affected his constitutional
rights and therefore required strict scrutiny review, the highest level of
judicial scrutiny.37 Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the contested
statute serves a compelling government interest and is "narrowly tailored"
to achieve that interest.38 Petitioner argued that the ban in Section 1513
could not survive such review because it was not narrowly-tailored and
served a purpose other than that articulated by the legislature.
The legislature articulated the apparent purpose of the Act in
Section 1102, entitled "Legislative Intent," stating that the political ban was
enacted to prevent corruption of the type that normally results when
members of any major industry makes large campaign contributions.4 0 In
light of that provision, however, a ban of all political contributions,
regardless of size, would appear to be overly-inclusive. Another
questionable characteristic of the ban is that it failed to require a connection
between the licensed gaming industry and the "recipient political
candidate."4' Finally, the legislature also failed to indicate any "scintilla of
evidence" that would connect licensed gaming and political contributions to
political corruption within the state of Pennsylvania.4 2
3 See Id.; 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(11) (2004) (amended 2010).
3s DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551 (quoting Soto, 565 A.2d at 1093-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989)).
36 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 538.
" Id. at 552.
n Id. at 540.
3 Id. at 543.
4 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (11) (2004) (amended 2010).
41 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 543.
42 Id. at 540-41.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
To begin its analysis, the DePaul court imposed a heavy burden for
overturning the Section 1513 ban, adopting the view that all doubts as to the
constitutionality of the statute were to be resolved in favor of the legislative
enactment.43 Thus, it required that the ban be construed, when possible, to
preserve its constitutionality."
A. Application ofStrict Scrutiny
The DePaul court first determined the applicable standard of
review. Using its previous decisions as guidance, the court found the
constitutional freedoms of speech and association were implicated by the
freedom of political expression limited by Section 1513.45 The court then
declared strict scrutiny the appropriate level of review where freedom of
expression is at issue.4 6 Although Section 1513 implicated this freedom,
the court also stated that the quantity of expression does not increase
substantially in correlation with the quantity of contribution.47 It follows
that political contribution bans, irrespective of size, restrict political
expression and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny review. As a result,
the constitutional question for the court became whether the Section 1513
ban was narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling state interest of
preventing the "actual or appearance of corruption" resulting from48
campaign contributions by principles in a large and influential industries.
B. The Court's Survey of Other Jurisdictions
With strict scrutiny established as the appropriate measure of
review, the court next looked to jurisdictions that had decided similar
constitutional questions.4 9 At the time of that survey, nineteen states had
legalized either "racinos"50 or some other form of gambling.'
Among those nineteen states, the legislative approaches to political
bans in the gaming industry were anything but uniform. 52 Five states had
enacted statutes imposing blanket bans to political contributions;53 however,
4 Id. at 545-46 (citing Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (Pa. 2005)).
4 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 546 (quoting In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. 1978)).
45 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 548.
46Id.
47 Id. at 547 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 20-21 (1976)).
4 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 552.
49 Id. at 544.
50 Id. at 548 (defining a "racino" as a combined racetrack and casino).
s' Id.
52 Id. at 551.
" Id. at 543.
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only two states' courts, New Jersey and Louisiana, upheld these blanket
bans in the face of a First Amendment challenge.-4 Notably, only one of
those bans would apply to an individual in Petitioner's particular ownership
position." The remaining fourteen states imposed either very specific
restrictions or no restrictions at all. 6
The courts upholding political bans required their respective
legislatures to demonstrate both a sufficiently important state interest and a
closely tailored means of protecting that interest. Specifically, the political
ban could not be an "unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.""
For example, bans survived judicial review when they applied solely to
casino "key employees," defined as "persons in a supervisory capacity or
empowered to make discretionary decisions which regulate casino
operations."" This select prohibition was found to be narrowly tailored to
protect governmental processes from unlawful influence. 59 Therefore, these
types of limited bans stand a better chance of withstanding constitutional
review.
Courts ruling in favor of blanket bans also held that the size of a
political contribution does not determine or reflect its potential to cause
corruption.6o For example, a ban on large political contributions could be
easily circumvented by a large number of smaller contributions.6' Also,
these courts refuted the necessity of an obvious or specified relationship
between the politician who receives the contribution and the gaming
industry providing it because public officers often "wield power or
influence beyond that which is inherent in [their] official duties."6
Blanket ban proponents argue that the "evils traditionally
associated with casino gambling" are too difficult to prevent with narrow
legislation.63 Jurisdictions adopting this view perceive concentration of
wealth in the gaming industry as an inevitable precursor to political
corruption." However, this assertion sometimes lacks the evidence needed
to support it.
54 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549.
ss Id. (stating that the New Jersey ban would not apply to an individual who merely owns an
interest in a business concern that owns an interest in the ownership of a gaming facility).
56 Id. at 549.
" Id. at 549.
5 Id. at 550 (quoting Solo, 565 A.2d at 1100).
9 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 550.
6o DePaul, 969 A.2d at 545 (citing Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61,
66 (Ill. 1976)) (noting that in Berz, 349 N.E.2d at 66, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an
overbreadth argument similar to the one the Petition level in DePaul).
61 Id. (noting that the Berz Court rejected the effectiveness of corruption prevention laws that
prohibited contributions above a certain dollar amount).
62 Id. (citing Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61, 67 (ill. 1976).
63 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551 (quoting Solo, 565 A.2d at 1093-1094).
6 See DePaul, 969 A.2d at 551.
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V. HOLDING
Ultimately, the DePaul court held that the appropriate test for
determining the constitutionality of blanket political bans is to assess the
relationship between the statute's legislative intent and the regulation used
to achieve it.65 Section 1102 of the Gaming Act recognizes that the Act's
primary objective of "protect[ing] the public."6 One other objective listed
in Section 1102, in direct reference to the Section 1513 political ban, stated
that a political ban is necessary to prevent "the actual or appearance of
corruption that may result from large campaign contributions...." 7
The DePaul court found that the legislative intent articulated a
fairly narrow governmental interest and that banning all political
68
contributions was not a narrowly drawn means of furthering that interest.
Consequently, the court held that the Section 1513 political ban violated
Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and enjoined its
enforcement. 6 9 The Pennsylvania legislature has not enacted any law nor
otherwise amended the Section 1513 political ban to address the articulated
concerns at the date of this Comment's publication.70
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
The recent economic recession caused a dramatic decrease in
betting and earnings at equine industry racetracks.n In hopes of raising
revenues, many racetracks have considered adding on-site gambling, most
commonly in the form of slot machines.72 States such as Pennsylvania have
seen increases in new tax revenue, the creation of thousands of jobs, and
reinvigoration of its horse industry, making on-site gambling an attractive
" See DePaul, 969 A.2d at 552.
" 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (1) (2004) (amended 2010).
67 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (11) (2004) (amended 2010).6 DePaUl, 969 A.2d at 552-53.
69 Id. at 554. Despite the court's ruling, in the 194 regular Session of the General
Assembly, the Pennsylvania Legislature voted to leave Section 1513 intact, making only minor
grammatical and structural changes. To address the court's rejection of the political ban in DePaul, the
legislature instead added two new provisions to Section 1102, "Legislative intent." New Section 10.1
states: "The General Assembly has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of both the electoral
process and the legislative process by preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption which
may arise through permitting any type of political contributions by certain persons involved in the
gaming industry and regulated under this part." New Section 10.2 states: "Banning all types of political
campaign contributions by certain persons subject to this part is necessary to prevent corruption and the
appearance of corruption that may arise when political campaign contributions and gambling regulated
under this part are intermingled." 4 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (10.1),(10.2) (2010).
7o See Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Licensure"
hyperlink; then follow "Political Influence Statement" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
71 Janet Patton, Drop in wagering eats into Ky. Coffers, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Sep.
22, 2009, available at http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/22/944935/ohio-high-court-ruling-puts-
racetrack.html.
72 id.
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option for the racing and gaming industry and the states in which they are
located. This trend is particularly relevant for Kentucky, home to multiple
racetracks, including Churchill Downs, the site of the world's most
renowned thoroughbred horse race, the Kentucky Derby. In Kentucky, the
addition of slot machines would transform the state's pre-existing
racetracks into "racinos." A proposal to allow slot machines in Kentucky's
racetracks has in recent years been both contemplated and rejected by the
Kentucky General Assembly and has been the topic of heated debate in
neighboring Ohio.74
While on-site gambling promises to benefit Kentucky and other
horse-racing states, the decision in DePaul reveals that it also has the
potential for negative consequences. States that do not already allow slot
machine gambling would need to enact statutes that include strict regulatory
provisions and establish some form of a gaming control board. DePaul's
exploration of the Pennsylvania Gaming Act reveals that regulations are
necessary to ensure governmental credibility and prevention of corruption
within industries of considerable wealth. This is particularly true in regards
to states such as Kentucky, where the horse racing industry is incredibly
influential and important to the local economy.
Furthermore, DePaul exposes the possibility that such regulatory
gaming laws can jeopardize constitutional rights. Although the DePaul
court declared the blanket ban unconstitutional, the court's analysis
included a survey of many jurisdictions that have upheld and continue to
impose political bans on certain categories of individuals. This is a serious
issue for states such as Kentucky and Ohio to consider when weighing the
costs and benefits of adding slot machine gambling to their racetracks.
Specifically, legislatures should consider whether the new revenue would
justify potentially sacrificing an individual's First Amendment rights.
It must also be noted that the DePaul court ordered strict scrutiny
review of political bans under racing and gaming statutes. Because such a
heightened level of will likely be imposed in other jurisdictions as well,
states implementing political bans must be prepared to demonstrate both a
sufficiently compelling interest and a closely tailored means of protecting
that interest. Specifically, state legislatures should ensure that their bans do
not cause any "unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."
When reviewing these bans, courts should consistently apply the strictest
7 Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, http://www.pgcb.state.pa.us (follow "Gaming"
hyperlink; then follow "Benefits for Pennsylvanians" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
74 Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio High Court Ruling Puts Racetrack Slots on Hold, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, Sept. 22, 2009, available at http://www.kentucky.com/2009/09/22/944935/ohio-high-
court-ruling-puts-racetrack.html.
" DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549 (citing Casino Ass'n of La v. La. ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494,
509 (La. 2002)).
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standard of review to ensure great stability and confidence in the protection
of First Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DePaul court struck down the Pennsylvania Gaming Act's
Section 1513 political ban even though it served two legitimate public
purposes: protecting public confidence and preventing government
corruption. Most similar blanket bans have met the same fate in other
courtrooms nationwide. While state governments have an understandably
strong interest in the regulation and integrity of the racing and gaming
industry, DePaul shows that such an interest, unless it can satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard of review, will not outweigh an individual's First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression. States have
extreme difficulty proving their political bans to be constitutional, as
evidenced by the fact that only two United States jurisdictions have upheld
complete blanket bans.
State governments must be applauded for any steps made towards
regulating and controlling the racing and gaming industry. Those efforts
surely bolster public confidence in the honesty and integrity of the state's
governmental functions. Such attempts must, however, be coupled with an
acute awareness of personal rights, for before the state is a protector of its
economy and government, it is a protector of its people and their
constitutional rights.
76 DePaul, 969 A.2d at 549.
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